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Abstract 
 
Focusing on the discovery of weak currents, the current debate on the theory-ladenness of 
observation in modern physics might be too narrow, as it concerns only the last stage of a 
complex experimental process and statistical methods required to analyze data. The scope 
of the debate should be extended to include broader experimental conditions that concern 
the design of the apparatus and different levels of the detection process. These neglected 
conditions often decisively delimit experiments long before the last stage has been 
reached, thus predetermining the extent of the dependence of data production on the 
theory. I explain the nature of these conditions and the theory-ladenness tendencies they 
produce, noting how they affect the last stage of the data analysis and providing some 
relevant examples. 
 
 
1. Introduction: theory-ladenness vs. the bottom-up statistical analysis in High Energy 
Physics  
 
The notion of the theory-ladenness of observation has been introduced (at least in its 
strongest form) as a blanket philosophical concept that notes an allegedly vicious 
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circularity in the empirical testing of hypotheses. According to this view, a theory change 
does not turn on independent, observationally arrived at empirical content (observational 
terms) on which we can agree; rather, it occurs in a way that renders incommensurate 
seemingly competing theories.  
Relying on the analysis of the discovery of weak neutral currents in high energy 
physics, Bogen and Woodward (1988), Mayo ( 1994. 1996) and Galison (1983, 1987) 
attempt to demonstrate that experimental results escape the theory-ladenness of 
observation objection, at least in its strongest form. It can be also understood as 
addressing the revised, weaker objection concerning theory-drivenness of observation.  
             The evidence for the unification of electromagentic and weak forces in particle 
physics turned up in the form of weak neutral currents. Such currents, kind of weak 
currents, do not produce any muons, unlike charged currents, as the interaction between 
neutron and neutrino is mediated by neutral Z
0 
bosons. (The charge of incoming and 
outgoing particles remains the same due to such bosons.) Thus, the lack of muons in 
relevant interactions was considered strong evidence for the existence of electroweak 
forces.   
                 Now, some particle interactions look just as desired evidence (e.g., lack of 
muons in relevant interactions) but they are only byproducts of interactions with the 
apparatus that surrounds the detecting area. A goal is to avoid recording such “artifact 
products” as much as
 
possible and to distinguish them from genuine interactions.
1
 Due to 
the complexity and the sheer number of background interactions the confirmation 
strategy and the criteria that guide it are usually realized by the computer simulations. 
                                                 
1
 This painstaking process can be complicated by the failure of a single circuit in the detector which might 
be reflected in the recordings as an event of significance.  
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The analysis of trigger biases (triggering algorithms determine which events of many 
more that occur in the detector will be recorded and studied) are run under various 
conditions are performed in order to discard as many of secondary interactions as 
possible.  The Monte-Carlo protocols are used in simulations of particle interactions 
collisions to distinguish genuine effects and the “artifact products” by offering 
probabilities that a recorded event is genuine. 
Despite differences in their approaches, the above-cited authors agree that 
physicists who worked on the experiment dealt with physical phenomena arrived at 
through the use of the bottom-up approach, i.e. extracted from raw data by particular 
statistical methods and procedures. Thus, the high-level theory had little, if anything, to 
do with the choice of reliable data that determine the experimental results (i.e. decisions 
whether enough genuine events was recorded to pronounce the discovery of neutral 
bosons). 
Bogen and Woodward (1988) offer a rather general argument for the above-
mentioned point. They introduce the distinction between scientific data and phenomena 
where inference from data to phenomena is a result of statistical techniques. The 
reliability of data is secured by experimental procedures which are based on statistical 
inferences as well as data reduction, exclusion of confounding factors, error and noise 
control, etc. – all of them employed without input of higher-order theory that they are 
supposed to confirm. The complex case they think illustrates well their account is 
precisely the discovery of weak neutral currents. 
          Mayo offers a more detailed account of actual procedures that supposedly secure 
statistical inferences. Her account of severe testing aims at providing the effect/noise 
 4
discrimination and elimination of explanation by artifacts (based on the effects due to the 
machine itself). Probability is the key to the explanation as it concerns the test procedure, 
not the hypothesis. More specifically, the analysis that leads to the explanation is based 
on error probabilities which tell scientists how mistaken they could be given the known 
state of the world.  
Both Mayo and Bogen & Woodward rely on Galison’s (1983) historical account 
of the discovery. It purports that discrimination of muonless and muonful events in 1970s 
was justified by statistical methods used by scientists within the framework that Galison 
characterizes as “established physics”. 
In contrast, Schindler (2008, 2011) has recently argued that experimentalists do 
not judge reliability of data or establish experimental results independently of the 
background theory. He deems the strong interrelation between theory and 
experimentation both necessary and desirable, and he demonstrates this, among other 
ways, by reconsidering the weak currents discovery. He resurrects Pickering’s (1984) 
initial analysis of the case that viewed the 1970s episode in light of the previous attempt 
at the discovery.  Both Pickering and Schindler agree that Galison unjustifiably assumed 
that what was done in the 1960s was simply mistaken – Galison argue that the physicists 
involved simply failed to make the discovery even though they believed for some time 
they made it. In contrast, Pickering’s detailed analysis (1984, 1997) suggests that the 
1960s group embraced comparatively loose criteria to interpret results of Monte Carlo 
simulations based on the recordings. This was received with skepticism in the 1960s – 
hence no discovery was made, but such loosening was the key to the discovery in the 
1970s. Fermilab’s initial failure to discover weak currents was essentially a result of the 
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agreement to use stricter criteria in interpreting results of Monte Carlo simulations – and 
such decisions lay in the details of their theoretical understanding.  
Pickering’s account was vigorously disputed by Galison (1987) and as vigorously 
defended by Schindler (2010) and Pickering (1990) himself. 
Even though this debate might be valuable in its own right (I will not try to 
resolve it in this paper), it and the philosophical accounts that motivate it neglect the fact 
that the production of experimental results and thus the extent of dependence of 
observation on the theory are influenced in a profound way by a broader experimental 
context.
2
 The groundwork for the production of results starts well before the actual theory 
is utilized in the statistical analysis of data and even before the actual data have been 
obtained. As a result of this neglect, the focus of the existing debate is somewhat narrow, 
as it deals exclusively with the last stages (statistical inferences) of the elaborate process 
of the production of experimental results and possible theory-ladenness in this particular 
context. Thus, this view is concerned with only one, and possibly not a crucial, layer of 
the dichotomy between bottom-up and down-top approaches in the complex process of 
the production of experimental results.  
In the experiments as complex as those in high energy physics (HEP) the stages of 
the experiments on which the proponents of the existing debate focus are greatly 
constrained by the broader experimental context where some of the key choices in terms 
of triggering programs
3
, scanning, and analysis have already been made once these last 
stages start unraveling. I will show how such conditions streamline the production of the 
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 The authors are aware of this possibility and some of them even hint at it (Bogen and Doodward 1988), 
but it has not been discussed among the participants of the debate. 
3
 Those are the programs that determine when exactly the events will be recorded, in effect choosing to 
detect only certain events (particle interactions and decays) out of vastly more that take place in the 
detector. 
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results to such an extent that the broader experimental context pre-determines the extent 
to which observations will be a matter of circularity of testing, i.e., determination of data 
by theoretical predispositions and theoretical reasons for believing in the reality of 
phenomena. This creates broad tendencies in the production of results in HEP, which 
typically lean towards one of the two extremes – bottom-up or top-down, much before 
the last statistical stage of the analysis takes place. I will label these tendencies “theory-
ladenness tendencies” that range from weak to strong. (We could as well label this notion 
“theory-dependence tendencies” as well, where the stronger theory-dependence theories 
would approach the initial, strong understanding of theory-ladenness. But this choice 
seems rather a rhetorical matter.) This makes it essential to understand broader 
experimental context and how exactly the last stages of the analysis fit in, if we want to 
fully understand the nature of dependence of observation on the theory. 
 A participant in the current, narrow, debate could remark that the debate is 
concerned with the extent to which analysis of data is dependent on the current theory 
once we have data – irrespective of the way in which one arrives at such data. But the 
point is that a possible strong dependence of methodology of data analysis on theory of 
this last stage can be trumped, severely limited or amplified earlier in the process.
4
 It is 
true that we can argue on the dependence on the theory of data analysis alone, but this is 
not a good enough reason to neglect the broader and possibly more substantial 
dependence, or the lack of it, on the theory. Otherwise, there is a danger that, at best, the 
existing debate remains focused only on a particular piece of a much larger puzzle 
                                                 
4
 For instance, the fact that the bottom-up statistical methods are applied might be neutralized by the 
design of the apparatus that is strongly influenced by the current theory or the lab employing a 
substantially theory-laden detecting regime (I will offer relevant examples of both shortly), taking it closer 
to a top-down approach. 
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concerning the theory-experiment interaction, and, at worst, either side’s account 
obfuscates the key aspects of the experimental process.  
 
2. The broader experimental conditions: design of the apparatus, data analysis and theory  
 
Detection in HEP experiments relies on, broadly speaking, two distinct systems of 
detection, semi-automatic and automatic (generic). (Perovic 2011) They have developed 
as two reasonable and distinct responses to the need for balancing efficiency in handling 
complexities of experiments with a direct involvement of physicists in detection. The 
computerized production, readings and statistical analysis of experimental results are 
much more dominant in some experiments while they are used only very selectively in 
others. Also, detection process in some experiments has been serviced by specialized 
trained technicians – the so-called “scanners” – while detection in other experiments was 
dominated by physicists involved in the entire discovery process.  
                      The increase in the automation was motivated by the expectation that such 
an approach would offer “experiments a thousand fold increase in cost-effectiveness. The 
combined reduction in cost and increase in computing power would allow experiments to 
use less biased trigger assumptions, record more data on tape, and simultaneously 
accelerate the data analysis leading to publication” (Hoddeson et al., 2008, 274-5). As a 
result, the recording of events has become mediated by the program that, in effect, 
reconstructs (provides estimates) rather than straightforwardly detects particle events. 
Now, the more automated approach to detection typically goes hand in hand with 
the experiments that aim at confirming a specific hypothesis, which requires analysis of 
 8
specific tracks rather than broad scanning and exploratory analysis that does not rely 
directly on current theory. Not surprisingly, such experiments are typically based on 
theoreticians’ current preferences. 
In one such typical and famous experiment that resulted in the discovery of W and 
Z bosons, the experimental apparatus consisted of very specialized detectors (to which 
we will turn our attention shortly) as the expected choice of tracks and triggers to be 
analyzed was very specific. Moreover, the experiment was really an accurate 
determination of the masses of particles whose existence was assumed based on the 
established theory; the masses of the particles were already determined fairly reliably and 
precisely (Amaldi 1987, 3; Blondel 1994, 418). And proton and anti-proton collisions 
that were analyzed in the experiment were treated as a test of the standard electro-weak 
model. And the experiment was designed directly on theoreticians’ request as the 
pressure to discover W and Z was strong at the time. (Darrilat 2004, 2) 
          The search for the proton decay had a very similar structure (Perkins 1984) 
although it turned out to be somewhat futile. It was initiated by a few leading 
theoreticians, despite the fact that many experimentalists regarded it as completely 
uninspiring at the time. The half-life of proton decay was found to be very close to the 
value suggested before the theoreticians’ initiative, close to infinity.  
            Now, even though in such confirmatory experiments the details of the statistical 
tinkering will decide whether (or rather when) the decision will be made that the 
discovery occurred – and this is the domain where exploratory statistical analysis can 
play a role, they already have a strong tendency towards theory-ladenness (i.e., strong 
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theory-dependence) of data production. The last stage can rectify this only within a 
domain severely limited by current theory. 
   Actually, the broadest conditions, yet perhaps the most constitutive of the 
theory-ladenness tendencies, emerge already at the level of the design of the apparatus. 
Such tendencies exhibited at the level of the design of the apparatus might be hardest to 
counter in later stages of the experiment.  
For instance, the explored energy domain explored by the apparatus in the W and 
Z bosons experiment was so narrow that one of two competing detectors, namely UA2 
“could not measure particle charges except for limited regions where W decay 
asymmetry was maximal” (Darriulat 2004, p. 6). In the same sense the UA1 was a “clean 
machine” (Ibid.) geared for only most accurate measurements within the existing 
theoretical framework. Thus, already the design of the apparatus based on very specific 
current theoretical expectations renders this experiment close to the top-down approach 
and inherently conducive to theory-ladenness of observation. And it minimizes the 
potential impact on theory-ladenness of the tinkering with statistical methods. 
 There is an even more drastic case of such broad initial limitations that can be 
overlooked if we focus on theory-dependence in the statistical analysis alone: the LHC is 
apparently bound to miss a part of the spectrum that potentially contains Higgs boson as 
predicted by SUSY, a major alternative to the Standard Model (Cobal 2006, 271). Thus, 
even if, for instance, the bottom-up side of a hypothetical debate on theory-ladenness of 
data analysis at LHC turns out to be correct, it would be a very limited assessment given 
the data domain to which the statistical analysis could have been applied: it neglects the 
fact that the data production was severely limited from the outset by the design of the 
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apparatus, which perhaps resulted in eliminating a crucial domain (for the discovery of 
Higgs boson) of data production.   
   It is important to realize though that the dependence of design of the apparatus 
on the theory is often part of broader, long-term research strategy which precedes it. 
Thus, often the same event can be explored with hadron colliders or linear accelerators of 
very different design. The latter favors exploratory detection as it produces very few 
background interactions, while the former requires heavy automation of the detection 
process due to heavy background. The linear accelerators however cannot as yet explore 
as high energy domains as hadron colliders due to technical constraints. Thus, the physics 
community is faced with numerous tradeoffs between exploratory and confirmatory 
searches, energy domains and saturation of the backgrounds at every level, which 
determine to a great extent whether and how much each stage of detection can be 
autonomous from the existing theory. 
              In contrast to confirmatory experiments and the excessive use of automation that 
goes along with it, the semi-automated systems are better suited for exploratory 
experiments that tinker with the triggering conditions, scanning and analysis. Such 
experiments are closer to a bottom-up approach as they are less conducive to theory-
ladenness of data and circularity of testing even irrespective of the extent of tinkering 
with statistical methods that takes place in the last stage of the analysis: the choice of 
energy regime, triggering algorithms, phenomena to investigate and detecting 
methodology already streamline production of data in a direction of strong autonomy 
from current theory. Actually, instead of hypothesis directly following current theory, a 
cluster of possible hypothesis loosely tied to or challenging the current theory is being 
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presumed. And the experiment is often a hypothesis-formative, rather than a hypothesis-
conformational tool. 
              A shining example of this experimental approach is the discovery of J/psi 
particles. In 1974 the existence of the charm quark was established in the form of J and 
psi particles (neutron mesons with 3-4 GeV masses) as a combination of a charm quark 
and its anti-quark. (Goldhaber 1997) The experiment was designed as a scanning of broad 
energy range without any theoretically-driven expectation of “narrow structures” that 
would indicate in advance possible existence of desired particles in the domains explored. 
An “inconsistency”, or a peak in cross-sectio at 3.1 GeV, completely at odds with current 
theory, was noted early and, in contrast to the methodology of confirmatory experiments, 
explored meticulously (Goldhaber 1997, 58-9). Actually, the physicists decided to 
introduce a new technique: to change the energy pattern and explore the cross-section as 
a function of colliding energy while looking for predicted resonances - and this tinkering, 
on a phenomenon detached from the current theory, resulted in the discovery (Ibid., 59-
62).  
             Similarly, the co-discovering team at Bevatron that worked with much larger 
backgrounds, due to the nature of their apparatus, developed triggers and analysis 
procedures suited for a broad search. (Ting 1977, 238) The guiding idea was precisely to 
set up the apparatus for the search of narrow resonances not predicted by the existing 
theory. (Ibid. 241) 
               Thus, if the use of Monte-Carlo protocols and the statistical analysis turns out to 
be of the kind that the bottom-up side argues for, it was nevertheless only a minor 
generator of the autonomy of the data production in the overall experiment compared to 
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the previous stages. If it turns out that the statistical analysis was guided by the theory – 
whatever that theory that was employed in the analysis might be (at best a provisional 
hypothesis loosely tied to the current theory) - it is really a minor point as the entire data-
preparation process resulted in choice of data that were fairly detached from current 
theory to start with. 
 
3.  Theory-ladenness of data production and detecting strategies 
 
Thus, the upward/downward theory-ladenness tendencies of data production depend 
neither exclusively nor primarily on the last stages of the analysis. The reasons deciding 
such tendencies are not uniform and it is not always easy to say which tendency is 
predominant in the experiment and the community developing it. The experimental 
background varies across periods and labs; different physicists opt for different 
approaches for various reasons which eventually place them closer to the bottom-up or 
top-down end of the spectrum of approaches. 
Sometimes one approach to detection is favored over another as a deliberate effort 
to pursue a particular view of science. For instance, R. R. Wilson, director of Fermilab in 
the 1970s, discouraged the computerization of Fermilab believing that individual 
physicists should be involved in every stage of the discovery process. (Hoddeson et al., 
2008, 341). This approach was motivated by his ideal of “science … pursued by lone 
independent explorer” and a physics lab as a place where an individual physicist has 
control over the entire experimental process.  
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At other times, the approach is largely driven by the culture of a laboratory. At 
CERN, the trend of rapid automation of detection was favored from the outset, driven by 
the hierarchical structure of the lab and detachment of experimentalists and theoreticians. 
Very early on experimentalists were turned into serviceman of the apparatus and external 
theoreticians were practically excluded from the experimental process. (Perovic 2011)  
At still other times, a detecting regime is a result of necessity. For example, the 
discovery of Ω mesons was a direct result of the application of a “pedestrian” regime of 
scanning and analysis when the computing power was already allocated to other projects. 
( Maglic et al. 1961) And in the case of the discovery of the second element of the meson 
pair, namely the ρ meson, the scanning machines were used full time on different 
problems deemed more important by the senior members of the lab. So J.A. Anderson 
and his collaborators (Anderson et al. 1961) made measurements directly on the scanning 
table. They applied the Chew and Low extrapolation method to predict dipion resonance 
(i.e., ρ meson). 
            Finally, to turn our attention to the much-discussed discovery of neutral currents, 
it was a standard confirmatory experiment that involved the elaborate study of a well-
known phenomenon without much innovation in experimental apparatus and techniques. 
The crux of the experiment lay in its final stage - the assessment of the statistical data 
with the aim of distinguishing artifact and genuine events that essentially span over a 
decade. The production of data and the design of the experiment did not involve anything 
like exploratory methodology that we have encountered for example in the J/psi 
discovery.  And it may not be surprising that CERN triumphed in the race, given that its 
organization favored confirmatory experiments. Thus, even though the outcome of the 
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debate over the theory-ladenness of the last stage of the experimental analysis might be 
valuable in this case, the broader conditions render the experiment as strongly theory-
laden in the first place which is yet another indication of the necessity to broaden the 
parameters of the debate. 
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